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Lofaso: In Defense of Public-Sector Unions

IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS
Anne Marie Lofaso *
"When the lion and the lamb lie down, if you look closely, when the
lion gets up, the lamb is missing."
"America is a government of the people, by the people, and for the
people. Who are the people? ... We're the farmers that fed the nation.
We're the firefighters that saved the nation. We're the police officers
who protect the nation. We're the teachers who taught the nation.
We're the nurses that healed the nation. We're the construction
workers who built the nation. We're the truck drivers who move the
nation. We're the coal miners that energize the nation. The American
labor movement-we are the people." 2
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Public-Sector Unions Attackedfor the States' Budget Shortfalls
The United States is currently in a heated debate over the extent to
which public-sector workers should be permitted to band together for

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, West
Virginia University College of Law. Many thanks to Robert Bastress, Jim Heiko, and
Michael Risch, who commented on early drafts of this Article and who have conversed
with me about the contents of this Article. I would especially like to thank Samuel
Estreicher for encouraging me to participate in this forum on public-sector unions and
Joe Slater for influencing my thinking on public-sector unions. Thanks to the West
Virginia University Law library staff, Miles Berger, Matthew Delligatti, Taylor Downs,
Jenny Flanigan, Nicholas Stump, Matthew T. Yanni, and the Hofstra Labor &
Employment Law Journal's editors for their research assistance; and to the Bloom
Faculty Research Grant for its support of this project. This Article is dedicated to C.
Edwin Baker, who continues to inspire me. All errors are the author's.
1. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Feb. 27, 2011), availableat
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2011/02/27/meet-the press_panel on union bill-in-wisco
nsin.html (Emanuel Cleaver, Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, paraphrasing a wellknown folktale).
2. Cecil Roberts, President, United Mine Workers of America, Keynote Address to New
York Public Employees Federation Health and Safety Conference (March 24, 2011), available at
http://newworkplace.wordpress.com/2011/04/05/lets-give-a-damn-about-our-coal-miners/.
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mutual aid or protection, to form, join or assist unions, and to bargain
collectively. This debate was sparked when, shortly after the 2010
midterm elections, politicians in states with large public deficits blamed
public-sector unions for budget shortfalls. Ostensibly to remedy the
situation in Wisconsin, Republican Governor Scott Walker, who
assumed office on January 3, 2011, proposed the Budget Repair Bill,
which would, among other things, raise public-sector employees' healthcare and pension contributions and strip public-sector employees of most
of their collective-bargaining rights. The situation quickly ignited when
thousands of Americans, including teachers, prison guards, and students,
descended on the Wisconsin Capitol in February 2011 to protest the bill
they viewed as suppressing government workers' collective-bargaining
rights under the guise of repairing the budget.4 In a concerted act of
defiance, fourteen Democratic legislators blocked passage of what they
perceived to be an anti-union bill by failing to show up for the vote, and
leaving the state in an attempt to force Republicans to the bargaining
table.5 On February 25, the Wisconsin Assembly passed the bill while
most of the Democratic representatives were out of town. On March 11,
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker signed that bill into law. 6 On May
26, a state circuit court issued a decision striking down the antiunion/budget repair law for violating Wisconsin's Open Meeting Law, a
law that mandates that "meetings of all governmental bodies, including
the Legislature itself, 'shall be preceded by public notice as provided [by
state statute], and shall be held in open session."
B. Public-Sector Unions Are Not the Cause of the States' Current
Budget Shortfalls
Public unions are not, however, the cause of the states' ills. After
all, public unions are not the source of wages and benefits-

3. 2011 Wisc. Act 10, availableat http://legis.wisconsin.gov/11Act010.pdf.
4. See 2011 Union Protests, TIMELINES.COM, http://timelines.com/topics/201 1-unionprotests (last visited May 13, 2011).
5. See id.
6. See Scott Bauer, Scott Walker Signs Wisconsin Union Bill into Law, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/1 1/scott-walker-signs(Mar. I1, 2011, 4:22PM),
wiscon n_834508.html.
7. Wisconsin v. Fitzgerald, No. 11-CV-1244, (May 26, 2011), available at
http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/1105260zannedecision.pdf. For an excellent summary of these
events, see Joseph E. Slater, The Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargaining:Real Harms and
Imaginary Benefits, https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Slater CollectiveBargaining.pdf
(June 2011).
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governments are. Furthermore, the evidence shows that, in general,
public-sector-union pay is lower than the pay of their private sector
counterparts even when benefits are taken into account; tenure is
typically not collectively negotiated but grounded in civil-servant
statutes; and arbitration is not a union benefit but the cost that unions
pay for a no-strike promise.8
Given the evidence, it is instructive to ask the following two
questions. First, why are public workers, especially public-union
employees, the subject of such vitriolic attack? Second, are publicsector unions worth defending?
In this Article, I answer both questions. Part I has introduced the
problem. Part II serves as background for understanding the economic
and political reasons that public-sector unions are currently under attack.
I argue that these attacks must be viewed in the context of the negative
impact that the recent recession has had on public-sector pension funds
and the influence that unions have had over the outcomes of political
elections.
In particular, I argue that public-sector unions are a
convenient scapegoat for government mismanagement and that union
political-spending patterns make them a more likely target of Republican
administrations. Part III, which comprises the most significant part of
this Article, presents a defense of unions and collective bargaining
grounded in participatory workplace democracy. In that section, I begin
by bringing together several strands of political theory, including
congruence theory, participatory democracy theory, and transformation
theory to show why unions are vital to a well-functioning democracy.
After arguing that there is no principled reason for refusing to apply the
workplace participatory rationale to public-sector unions, I demonstrate
that most of the arguments against public-sector unions are false,
misleading, or pretextual. Part IV looks to the future of public-sector
unions and offers some thoughts about how we may more constructively
analyze the current fiscal problems facing state and local governments.

8.

See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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II. A Confluence of Economic and Political Events Have Made PublicSector Unions an Easy Scapegoat for State and Local Politicians
To Blame for Their States' Financial Woes
A. The Great Recession, which Resulted in UnprecedentedPost-War
Unemployment Rates and Market Declines that Negatively Impacted
Pension Plans,Has Createdan Opportunityfor Politiciansto Divide the
Working Class
Significantly, the debate over public-employee-union rights takes
place during the deepest economic recession to hit the United States and
the world since the Great Depression. As Harvard University Professor
of Economics Lawrence F. Katz observed, "[1]abor market conditions
have deteriorated dramatically since the start of the Great Recession in
late 2007 making this the severest labor market downturn since the Great
Depression of the 1930s." 9 It is commonly understood that market
declines during that recession have "significantly diminished the asset
value of . .. [state and local government pension] plans."' 0 Many of the
public-sector pension plans (union and nonunion) are defined-benefit
plans-plans that "promise[] a specified monthly benefit at
retirement."" That means that the government is ultimately liable to
fund those benefits to the extent that they are guaranteed by state law or
contract. Accordingly, taxpayers (including private-sector employees)
already strapped by a recession with the highest unemployment rates in
over sixty years,12 are potentially liable to pay for those benefits. This
situation makes public employees and their union representatives a
natural scapegoat for government mismanagement by dividing public
sector employees, who have been faring well during the recession, and
other workers, who have not fared as well.
9. Lawrence F. Katz, Long-Term Unemployment in the Great Recession: Testimony for the
Joint Economic Committee U.S. Congress, Hearing on "Long-Term Unemployment: Causes,
Consequences

and

Solutions,"

Apr.

29,

2010,

available

at

http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.employmentpolicy.org/files/jec testimonykatz_042
910.pdf.
10. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-754, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PENSION PLANS: GOVERNMENT PRACTICES AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES HAVE
EVOLVED GRADUALLY AS PLANS TAKE ON INCREASED INVESTMENT RISK 1 (2010) [hereinafter

GAO-10-754].
I1. Retirement Plans,Benefits & Savings: Types ofRetirement Plans, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited May 19, 2011).
12. Anne Marie Lofaso, The Relevance of the Wagner Act for Resolving Today's Job-Security
Crisis, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE 62ND ANNUAL
MEETING 2010 (forthcoming 2011).
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B. Public-Sector Unions Are More Likely To Contribute to Liberal
Causes and to Democratic Candidates
This debate also comes on the heels of Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission.13 There, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from using general
treasury funds to make independent expenditures for publicly
disseminated electioneering speech.14 Specifically, speeches that
advocated for the election or defeat of a federal candidate within 30 days
of a primary election were found to be constitutional."
The practical effect of Citizens United was to liberalize spending on
speech advocating views about political candidates. As a result, in the
2010 mid-term elections, unions spent approximately $25.1 million on
outside donations.16 This amounted to 23.9 percent of total outside
spending reported. Of this total, only $25,000 was donated to
conservatives.17 Broken down further, public-sector unions, which
represented the industry that disclosed the most amount of money,
donated over $10 million exclusively to liberals. 8
But this snapshot does not tell us the entire story. Corporations and
unions also make campaign contributions-expenditures that were not
affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United. In the
2010 mid-term elections, unions spent a total of $96,574,695 on
campaign contributions. 9 Of this total, 68 percent of the contributions
($65,317,751) were given to Democrats, and 5 percent ($4,487,222)
were given to Republicans.2 0 Spending by unions in the 2010 cycle
represented 5.1 percent of 2010 total contributions. By contrast,
businesses spent a grand total of $1,360,667,040 contributing to the

13. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886-88 (2010) (holding that Section 441(b) of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 unlawfully suppresses political speech).
14. Id. In so holding, Citizens United overruled McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203-09
(2003), to the extent it upheld limits on electioneering communications, and Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-66 (1990), which had upheld a state campaign finance
law that prohibited corporations from using corporate treasury funds to support or oppose the
election of political candidates. See id.
15. Id.
16. 2010
Outside
Spending,
by
Donors'
Industries,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp-I&type=A (last updated
April 25, 2011).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Business-Labor-IdeologySplit in PAC & Individual Donationsto Candidatesand Parties,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php (last updated Apr. 25, 2011).
20. Id.
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2010 cycle, representing 72.2 percent of total contributions. Of the total
amount contributed by the business sector, 49 percent of business' total
contributions ($660,255,869) went to Democrats and 46 percent
($626,397,324) went to Republicans. 2 1 Although Republicans were able
to make important in-roads in such rust-belt states as Ohio, Michigan,
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, they lost in close races in other important
swing states, such as Colorado and West Virginia.2 2 Many attribute
those losses to union campaigning.23
C. Union Campaign Spending Patterns Give Republicans an Incentive
to Silence Unions
This picture shows the incentives that various political groups have
to shrink the amount available for political expenditure from the general
treasuries of institutions, such as unions, which provide an opposing
point of view to the voice of conservative groups. In this context, the
incentive goes to the Republicans to shrink union treasuries available for
political spending. Potentially, one very effective way of accomplishing
that goal is to weaken unions. If public-sector unions are weakened by
Republican initiatives, then there will be little to no opposition in raising
campaign funds in most elections, effectively allowing more
conservative groups to have a much louder voice. 24
This picture also shows the incentives that those in political power
in states with large public debt have to blame the public union as the
cause of that debt. The story is written for them. The 2008 stock market
crash greatly diminished the value of defined-benefit pension plans just
when many baby boomers are set to retire. 25 In fact, before the 2008
stock market crash, many government funded pensions were 80 percent
2 1. Id.
22. See Scott Conroy, GOP Makes Significant Gains in Governorships, REAL CLEAR
2010),
3,
(Nov.
POLITICS
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/11/03/gopmakes significant gains ingovernorshi
ps_107820.html; Jill Lawrence, GOP Wave of Change Hits House; Republicans Also Gain
Governorships, POLITICS DAILY (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/11/02/2010midterm-elections-news-and-results/.
23. Alexander Bolton, Labor Helps Key Senate Dems (Joe Manchin, Michael Bennet), But
27,
2010),
(Oct.
FREE
REPUBLIC
Dogs,
Blue
House
Most
Abandons
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2616315/posts. Blue dogs are congressional Democrats
who identify themselves as moderates. The term is primarily used to refer to House members.
24. See George Lakoff, The Real Issues: A Wisconsin Update, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-lakoff/the-real-issues-aPM),
1:19
2011,
wiscons b_828640.html.
25. GAO-10-754, supranote 10.
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funded-the industry standard funding level.26 By blaming public unions
for the debt caused by Wall Street's financial crisis and stock market
crash, politicians divert attention to what they are really doingcoercively removing the economic and political rights of their civil
servants. This is an easy story to swallow for private-sector taxpayersmany of them victims of the 2008 stock market crash. In the meantime,
public unions have been weakened by false and misleading messaging as
well as by curtailment of their right to engage in collective bargaining.
These measures would predictably result in lower public-sector union
membership, which in turn results in less money in their general
treasuries available to spend on Democratic Party candidates.
III. IN DEFENSE OF UNIONS: THE PARTICIPATORY WORKPLACE
DEMOCRACY RATIONALE

A. Overview: Unions Are Vital to a Well-FunctioningDemocracy
Unions are organizations of workers who have banded together to
achieve common goals typically to improve hours, wages, and other
terms or conditions of employment; and to engage in other mutual aid or
protection. 27 These purposes can be accomplished through various
means but most typically through bargaining collectively,2 grieving and
3
arbitrating disputes, 29 wielding economic weapons, such as pickets,30
26. Elizabeth K. Kellar, Preface to ALICIA H. MUNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY, & LAURA
QUINBY, CENTER FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXCELLENCE, ISSUE BRIEF, THE FUNDING
OF STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: 2009-2013 (April 2010).
27. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
28. See, e.g., id. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
29. The Steelworkers Trilogy cements arbitration as the presumptive method of resolving
labor contract disputes with only limited court review. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am.
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960) (holding that an employer must arbitrate any grievance that
falls within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement regardless of the grievances
merits); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960)
(announcing a presumption in favor of arbitration rebuttable by "only the most forceful evidence of
a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration"); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (holding that, in cases where an employer or union refuses to
comply with the arbitrator's award, the court's role is limited to determining whether the award
"draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"). Arbitration, which favors industrial
peace, is viewed as the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 107 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting) (asserting that union implicitly waived its right
to strike, for the life of the collective-bargaining agreement, by agreeing to arbitrate labor disputes
arising under that agreement); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957)
(stating that "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a nostrike agreement").
30. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (b)(7).
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secondary boycotts, ' and strikes,32 or engaging in political action such
as legislative lobbying. Among the most common reasons or values
cited in support of protecting workers' rights to form unions are to
equalize bargaining power between employees and their employers, to
promote workplace justice, to encourage workplace peace, and to
support workplace democracy.
This Article focuses on one such value-workplace participatory
democracy. To examine that value, this Section asks and presents the
following question: Why should a liberal representative democracy, such
as the United States, want to encourage workplace democracy in the
form of collective bargaining? The answer that emerges is that unions,
including public-sector unions, are vital to a well-functioning democracy
and therefore should be protected.
B. LiberalDemocracies, like the United States, Should Encourage
Workplace ParticipatoryDemocracy Because Democratic Social Units
Promote PoliticalStability
The United States is a liberal democracy-its government is
characterized by group or collective decision-making grounded in the
equality of its citizens.34 Liberal democracy, as it took hold in the
United States, "offers a politics that justifies individual rights. It is
concerned more to promote individual liberty than to secure public
justice, to advance interests rather than to discover goods, and to keep
[people] safely apart rather than to bring them fruitfully together."3 5 The
United States is therefore particularly good at "fiercely resisting every
assault on the individual-his privacy, his property, his interests, and his
rights-but is far less effective in resisting assaults on [communitarian
values]."3 According to political theorist Benjamin R. Barber, liberal
democracy's low capacity to resist assaults on communitarian values,

31. See, e.g., id. § 158(b)(4).
32. See, e.g., id. § 163.
33. See, e.g., id. § 151; see generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (identifying rights of employers and employees, as well as limitations on these rights).
34. As used in this paper and as described herein, the term, liberal democracy, is a term of art
used by political theorists to describe democratic governments, such as the United States, whose
powers are delineated and limited by a constitution, where collective decision making is made by
elected representatives, and which tends to protect various liberties. It does not connote anything
about the political spectrum of that country's government or citizenship.
35. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR ANEW AGE
4(1984).
36. Id.
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which would include citizenship and participation, is its "vulnerability."
In Barber's view, this vulnerability ultimately "undermines its defense of
the individual; for the individual's freedom is not the precondition for
political activity but rather the product of it."37
If Barber is correct about liberal democracy's vulnerabilities and if
we actually cherish communitarian values, instrumentally if not
intrinsically, then a liberal democracy, such as the United States
government, needs mechanisms for sustaining and further developing its
capacity to protect these values. For political theorists such as Carole
Pateman, C. B. Macpherson, and Benjamin Barber, liberal democratic
societies must develop outlets for participation not only in the political
sphere but in the nonpolitical social units, such as family, work and
education. "Participatory democratic theory envisions the maximum
participation of citizens in their self-governance, especially in sectors of
society beyond those that are traditionally understood to be political (for
example, the household and workplace)."
My thesis here is limited to the extent to which and the ways in
which worker self-governance bolsters and stabilizes American
democracy. To make this argument persuasive, the following questions
should be assessed:
(1) To what extent should the organization of social units,
work in particular, reflect the government's organization?
what extent can social units, such as work, diverge from
government's authority pattern but still bolster
government's stability?
(2) What justifies
workplace?

democratizing social

and
To
the
the

units, such as the

(3) What is the relationship between the particular sector of
participation (in this case, the workplace) and the government
in terms of decision making (mode of participation)?
In examining these questions below, I rely on political theory to draw
three conclusions. First, to maintain a well-functioning democracy,
American workplaces should reflect the democratic authority patterns of

37. Id.
38. Jeffrey D. Hilmer, The State of Participatory Democratic Theory, 32 NEW POL. SCI. 43,
43 (2010).
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Second, democratizing American
the United States government.
workplaces is likely to strengthen the U.S. government by teaching
workers how to be better, more public-minded citizens. Third, the
relationship between the American workplace and the U.S. government
is pyramidal-workers can directly participate in decisionmaking at the
workplace, a much smaller social unit than the U.S. government, where
they can learn the skills necessary to enter the top of the pyramid, which
involves more representative forms of government and oftern a
workplace of experts.
1. Social Units, Such as Work, Should Reflect the Government's
Authority Patterns
Political scientists have focused much of their research on the study
of the state and its governance. Other social units, such as family,
school, community, and work, are microcosms for society and have their
own systems of governance. 3 9 Those micro-governmental systems
operate within sectors of participations, such as the household, the
classroom, the neighborhood, and the workplace.40
Social units, such as these, are the key to democratization,
according to the late political science professor Harry Eckstein. Dr.
Eckstein's political theory of congruence postulates that "[g]overnments
perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with
the authority patterns of other units of society."41 For Eckstein, "high
performance (above a threshold) requires high congruence," 42 where
congruence means similarity among the "authority patterns of all [the]
Eckstein further postulates that "[d]emocratic
social units."43
governments perform well only if their authority patterns exhibit
'balanced disparities'-that is, combinations of democratic and
nondemocratic traits."4
Eckstein argued that stable democracies are associated with social
units that reproduce in greater or lesser degrees the authority patterns of
the greater society.
Eckstein thought that, in an ideal society,

39. Hany Eckstein, Congruence Theory Explained, in HARRY ECKSTEIN ET AL., CAN
DEMOCRACY TAKE ROOT IN POST-SOVIET RussIA? EXPLORATIONS IN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS
3,5 (1998).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Hilmer, supra note 38, at 46.
Eckstein, supra note 39, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 4.
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congruence would entail similarity in "the authority patterns of all social
units."45 In refining his theory, he realized that, as a practical matter,
congruence could still exist "if the authority patterns of a society exhibit
a pattern of graduated resemblances."46 By this, Eckstein meant that the
more significant a role that the social unit plays in the socialization into
the government, the closer it should resemble the democratic structure of
the government.47
Eckstein has also suggested, however, that the workplace (along
with the household and the school) is one of the most important socialunit sectors to democratize but also one of the least capable of being
democratized.4 8 In Eckstein's view, the most we can hope for is a
simulated workplace democracy that dovetails with or supports the
democracy's authority patterns. 49 This is where workplace democracy
theorists depart to some extent with Eckstein. As shown below,
workplace democracy theorists, such as Carole Pateman, believe that
however difficult it may be to democratize the workplace, it can and
should be done.

45. See id. at 12.
46. Id.
47. Eckstein calls this proximity of socialization "adjacency." According to Eckstein, there
are two general criteria for determining adjacency:
One is that adjacency with extent of "boundary-exchange" between social units--that is, the
extent to which one unit serves as a special unit for recruitment into another, especially into its
higher positions of superordination. In democracies, political parties always matter greatly in
regard to this criterion. ...

Secondly, social units are adjacent if one plays a significant role for socialization into another-for learning the norms and practices that pertain to the other unit's roles. What these are in regard
to political socialization is, in all cases, a problem for research....
Harry Eckstein, Congruence Theory Explained,
http://www.democ.uci.edulpublications/papersseriespre200l/harry2.htm (last visited May 28, 2011).
This article focuses on workplace-government adjacency. Beyond the scope of this article is an
analysis of the extent of adjacency with other social units, such as family-government adjacency or
school-government adjacency.
48.

HARRY ECKSTEIN, A THEORY OF STABLE DEMOCRACY (Ctr. of Int'l Studies, Princeton

Univ., Res. Monograph No. 10, 1961), reprinted in DIVISION AND COHESION INDEMOCRACY app.
b at 237-38 (1966).

49. Id.
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2. Democratizing the Workplace Strengthens Liberal Democracies by
Transforming the Self
One way to justify workplace participatory democracy is to show
that it will result in a more stable political democracy in the United
States. A stable democracy is characterized by "persistence in pattern,
decisional effectiveness, and authenticity." 50 The key to linking
participation with stability is to show how educating people in
democratic modes of decision making transforms the character of those
individuals into citizens who are more likely to participate in the civic
life demanded by a well-functioning liberal democracy.
The theory of participatory democracy focuses on the extent to
which "individuals should receive some 'training' in democracy outside
the national political process." 5' This theory, which is part of a more
expansive version of democracy, holds that
standard liberal democracy fails to articulate goods that are inherent in
democracy and exaggerates the threats posed by democracy to other
goods. On this view, these limitations follow from a more general
failure of standard liberal democracy to appreciate the transformative
impact of democracy on the self, a failure rooted in its view of the self
as prepolitically constituted. On the expansive view, were individuals
more broadly empowered, especially in the institutions that have most
impact on their everyday lives (workplaces, schools, local
governments, etc.), their experiences would have transformative
effects: they would become more public-spirited, more tolerant, more
knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more
probing of their own interests. These transformations would improve
the workings of higher-level representative institutions, as well as
mitigate-if not remove-the threats democracy is held to pose to
rights, pluralism, and governability. 52
The theory further posits that "the education for democracy that
takes place through the participatory process in non-governmental
authority structures requires, therefore, that the structures should be
Participatory democracy theory concludes that the
democratised.""
main modes of participation-deliberation and collective decision

50.

Id.

51.

CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45 (1970).

52.
(1992).
53.

Mark Warren, Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 8, 8
PATEMAN, supranote 51, at 45.
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making-should be extended to political and non-political social sectors,
and the workplace, in particular.
As Professor Jeffrey Hilmer explains, the following three
arguments are often put forward for this position:
(1) "self-government increases citizens' sense of political efficacy and
empowerment;"
(2) "frequent participation in self-government produces a more
politically astute citizenry;"
(3) "the expansion of democratic participation into traditionally nonparticipatory sectors of society tends to break the monopoly of state
power and engender a more equitable and humane society." 54
Although critics of participatory democracy typically point to a
dearth of evidence to support the position that "citizens who actively
participate in their self-governance will experience a heightened sense of
political efficacy and empowerment," 5 there is empirical evidence to
support that position. 6 Most recently, Professor Hilmer surveyed case
studies of participatory democracy in Porto Alegre, Brazil-studies that
examined Brazil's transition from dictatorship to constitutional
democracy in part by examining participatory approaches to budgeting
and public expenditure at local levels. Hilmer concluded that these
studies supported the participatory democracy theorists' claim that
citizen participation in self-governance is empowering. 57
Professor Hilmer drew three conclusions from his survey. First, he
concluded that the Porto Alegre case studies evidence that "participatory
politics, in the form of the participatory budgeting process of the [citizen
budgetary councils], does enhance citizens' sense of political efficacy
and empowerment." 8 One 2005 study published by Stanford University
Press concluded that the citizen budgetary councils "'deeply transformed
civic life in Porto Alegre"' by bringing together "'several thousand

54. Hilmer, supra note 38, at 56.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., PATEMAN, supra note 51, at 98-102 (explaining how Yugoslavia's workers'
self-management system, although functioning in a communist state, still demonstrated how
democratization of industry is not impossible); Hilmer, supra note 38, at 55-62 (presenting an
empirical case study on the citizen budgetary councils in Porto Alegre, which have created a strong
recognition of political empowerment).
57. Hilmer, supra note 38, at 56 n.64, 57.
58. Id.
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participants [in open-ended discussion and civic involvement]. . . to

demand accountability, and make real decisions.'" 59
Second, Professor Hilmer concluded that the Porto Alegre case
studies evidence greater participation and political astuteness as
measured by "access . . . to the information necessary to make effective

political judgments and to the political, social, and economic institutions
that affect [citizens'] everyday lives." 6 0 In this case, his survey of the
studies showed that access to decision making within several
administrative bodies of the citizen budgetary councils was not
exclusive; in those cases, the administrators were required to explain the
decision "'to a body of representative delegates,"' thereby "enabl[ing]
citizens to monitor and control the administrative function of the state." 61
In Hilmer's view, this evidence strengthens the participatory democracy
theory that "citizens learn by doing," regardless of their initial
intellectual starting points.62 It is the opportunity that transforms the
citizen to learn how to be a democratic citizen.
Third, Professor Hilmer finally concluded that the Porto Alegre
case studies evidence a tendency toward extending participation "into
traditionally non-political sectors of society," which eventually breaks
the state's monopolistic power: "On this point Porto Alegre offers some
insight into how participatory democracy has helped citizens to directly
exert political power in ways that engender a more equitable and
humane society." 63 In particular, Hilmer sees the Porto Alegre
experiments in participatory democracy as having "transform[ed]
private-minded individuals into public-minded citizens," thereby
creating a "public sphere," such as the one described by Jirgen
Habermas:
... all members of the community are allowed to participate regardless
of income, education, or political experience. Consequently,
participants increasingly see themselves as equal members of a
community of citizens debating and deliberating about the common
good. This exercise in collective or general will formation tends to
transform private-minded individuals into public-minded citizens ....
59. Id. at 57 & nn.66-68 (quoting GIANPAOLO BAIOCCHI, MILITANTS AND CITIZENS: THE
POLITICS OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN PORTO ALEGRE 138 (2005)).

60.
61.

Id. at 58.
Id. (citing Leonardo Avritzer, Modes of Democratic Deliberation: Participatory

Budgeting in Brazil, in DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CANON

397 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2006)).
62.

Id. at 59 (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1954)).

63.

Id. at 60.
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The result of this transformation is a citizenry that increasingly acts
with the common good as its guiding star. Citizens begin to see their
individual well-being as inexorably interconnected with the well-being
of their society and make political decisions accordingly. In so doing
citizens implement policies that take into account equally the interests
of all citizens. 4
As a result of this transformation, the "poorer citizens [of Porto Alegre]
were able to redirect funds to their sectors of the city through their
participation in the [citizen budgetary councils]."6 5
Critics may claim that, even if it is a good idea and even if it is
possible to democratize some social units, it is nearly impossible to
democratize the workplace in particular. Professor Carole Pateman's
research debunks that argument.66 Professor Pateman surveyed studies
of worker self-governance in Titoist Yugoslavia. 67 These studies, done
mostly in the mid to late 1960s, showed "fairly high rates of [worker]
participation" among the working class. 68 Professor Pateman concluded
that "the Yugoslav experience gives us no good reason to suppose that
the democratisation of industrial authority structures is impossible,
difficult and complicated though it may be." 69

64. Id. at 60-61 (citing, among other things, JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS
SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991) (1962)).
65. Id. at61.
66. See PATEMAN, supra note 51, at 102.
67. Id. at 88.
68. See id. at 99.
69. Id. at 102. The ultimate fate of Titoist Yugoslavia provides some support that
participatory democratic theory is not just a pipedream. Titoist Yugoslavia was a communist
dictatorship held together in large part by the charisma of Tito himself. See LAURA SILBER &
ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION 28-29 (Penguin Books 1997) (1996).

Upon

his death and with the fall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia broke apart into at least some democratic
states. See id. at 29. It seems that participatory democratic theory would have predicted this
outcome-first, a lack of stability caused in part by a lack of congruence between the government's
authority patterns and some social units; and second, the penetration of democratic social units
breaking the state's monopoly hold.
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3. The Pyramidal Relationship Between Workplace Democracy and a
Liberal Governmental Democracy: Citizens Learn How to Become
Public-minded Within the Lower, More Participatory Parts of the
Societal Pyramid for Socialization into the Representative Structures
Near the Top of the Pyramid
Workplace participatory
democracy
strengthens
political
democracy by training workers how to be public-minded citizens.
Whereas Carole Pateman and Benjamin Barber emphasize the
importance of participatory democracy, C.B. Macpherson realistically
accepts that, in an American-style liberal democracy that "operate[s]
through a . . . congressional structure," 7 0 "there will have to be some
kind of representative system, not completely direct democracy." 71 Even
still, Macpherson posits a "pyramidal system with direct democracy at
the base and delegate democracy at every level above that." 72 For
Macpherson,
[a]s soon as democracy is seen as a kind of society, not merely a
mechanism of choosing and authorizing governments, the egalitarian
principle inherent in democracy requires not only 'one man, one vote'
but also 'one man, one equal effective right to live as fully humanly as
he may wish.' 73
Putting together Carole Pateman's and Benjamin Barber's theories
of participatory democracy, C.B. Macpherson's pyramidal theory, and
Harry Eckstein's congruence theory results in a working description of
the relationship between the workplace and a liberal democracy. In a
liberal democracy with a market economy, citizens learn about
democracy by participating in democracy at home, in the community, at
school, and at work.
These social, non-political sectors can
accommodate more participatory modes of democracy because they are
smaller and more intimate than state and federal government. By
participating in social-unit democracy, such as collective bargaining at
the workplace, citizens are more likely to participate in other forms of

c.B. MACPHERSON,
71. Id. at 95.
70.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 114 (1977).

72. Id. at 108. Professor Hilmer makes a similar analysis of Macpherson's work. See Hilmer,
supra note 38, at 46; see also Anne Marie Lofaso, British and American Legal Responses to the
Problem of Collective Redundancies (July 1996) (unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, University of
Oxford) (on file with author).
73.

C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 51 (1973).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol28/iss2/4

16

Lofaso: In Defense of Public-Sector Unions

2011]

IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS

317

both political and non-political forms of democracy. In the process, the
character of these individuals is transformed.74
This pyramidal structure meets Eckstein's congruence theory-that
congruent authority patterns between government and social units
promotes governmental stability-and its corollary-that there should
be a balance between democratic and nondemocratic elements. First,
under a participatory workplace model, the workplace itself is organized
in a democratic manner. Employees participate in decisions affecting
their work lives and in the process become part authors of their work
lives.7 ' This participation transforms the character of these workers,
thereby transforming worker autonomy into citizen autonomy. The
workplace thereby resembles the U.S. government's authority pattern.
Second, it also meets the democratic-nondemocratic balance corollary.
Collective bargaining over wages, hours, and other terms or conditions
of employment (mandatory subjects of bargaining) is accomplished in
the generally hierarchical, nondemocratic organization of corporate
America. Furthermore, in the private-sector and in some parts of the
public-sector, labor disputes are resolved by presidentially appointed
experts on the National Labor Relations Board or a public labor board
rather than by elected officials.7 6
Collective decision-making over mandatory subjects of bargaining
gives workers some control over their work lives, which in turn
Indeed, union
transforms union workers into better citizens.
membership positively correlates with voter turnout.77 These data
suggest that the unionized workplace is one of the most important
sectors for adult citizens to learn how to be better citizens in a
democracy.

74. See PATEMAN, supra note 51, at 45-66.
75. Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a FoundationalTheory of Workers' Rights: The Autonomous
Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 39 (2007) (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 369 (1986)).
76. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153 (establishing the National Labor Relations Board).
77. See, e.g., Benjamin Radcliff & Patricia Davis, Labor Organization and Electoral
Participationin IndustrialDemocracies, 44 AM. J. POL. SCL 132, 140 (2000) ("[D]eclines in labor
organization mean a decline in the proportion of citizens contributing their preferences to the
democratic process."); Patrick Flavin & Benjamin Radcliff, Labor Union Membership and Voter
Turnout Across Nations (unpublished manuscript presented at annual meeting of the Midwest
available at
2009),
2-5,
IL, Apr.
Chicago,
Association,
Science
Political
204 3632 4
3
0 /p
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla apa research citation/3/6/3/2/0/pages 63
1.php.
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C. Workplace ParticipatoryDemocracy Is Necessary To Protect Public
Employees from Government Coercion
Liberal democracy theory views citizens as having conflicting
interests, whereas participatory democracy theory views participation as
a way of uniting citizens into a common interest. 8 Rights discourse in
the United States tends to reinforce the observation that citizens have
conflicting interests, insofar as rights are themselves based on interests."
Accordingly, American rights discourse reinforces the idea that conflict
is inevitable in social units, such as the workplace. The rights-based lens
can, therefore, cloud rather than clarify the role of participation in the
workplace.
More precisely, rights create correlative duties that the rights holder
can claim against the one who is legally obligated.80 Rights holders and
duty holders are therefore pitted against one another based on conflicting
interests. The reality of a liberal democracy devoted to defending rights
then is that citizens' sundry interests remain in a constant state of
conflict, often based on conflicting values.8 '
To be sure, conflicting rights, interests, and values are common in
the workplace. Workers' and employers' rights are based on interests
that often result in conflict. Workers are interested in job security, living
wages, secure retirement, health and safety, and other "good" terms and
conditions of employment. Workers therefore have an interest in
securing rights that protect these interests. These rights are based, at
least in part, on substantive autonomy (self-actualization) and human
liberty. 82 To accomplish the profit-maximization goal, employers desire
a productive, orderly workforce and therefore have an interest in
obtaining and maintaining managerial and property rights. These rights
are themselves based on free market values such as efficiency and
wealth maximization.83

78.

See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE,

BEYOND ADVERSARY

DEMOCRACY 3 (1980)

(comparing "adversary" and "unitary" democratic models and explaining participatory democracy
as a form of unitary democracy, "based on common interest and equal respect").
79. See RAZ, supranote 75, at 181-82.
80. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING 36-38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923); RAZ, supranote 75, at 183-86.
81. See BARBER, supra note 35, at 4. For a discussion on conflicting values, see generally
Lofaso, supra note 75.
82. Lofaso, supra note 75, at 38-39, 49 (citing RAz, supra note 75, at 369; RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 181 (1977)).

83. See id. at 7-9 (citations omitted).
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As Professor Barber observes, the American political tradition
contains three "contradictory impulses"-the anarchist strain, the realist
strain, and the minimalist strain-that co-exist as different approaches to
the problem of conflict:
The American political system is a remarkable example of the coexistence-sometimes harmonious, more often uncomfortable-of ...
three dispositions.

Americans . . . are anarchists in their values

(privacy, liberty, individualism, property, and rights); realists in their
means (power, law, coercive mediation, and sovereign adjudication);
and minimalists in their political temper (tolerance, wariness of
government, pluralism, and such institutionalizations of caution as the
separation of powers and judicial review).
The anarchist, realist, and minimalist dispositions can all be regarded
as political responses to conflict, which is the fundamental condition of
all liberal democratic politics. Autonomous individuals occupying
private and separate spaces are the players in the game of liberal
politics; conflict is their characteristic mode of interaction. Whether he
perceives conflict as a function of scarce resources (as do Hobbes and
Marx), of insatiable appetites (as do Russell and Freud), or of a natural
lust for power and glory (as does Machiavelli), the liberal democrat
places it at the center of human interaction and makes it the chief
concern of politics.
While the three dispositions may share a belief in the primacy of
conflict, they suggest radically different approaches to its amelioration.
Put very briefly, anarchism is conflict-denying, realism is conflictrepressing, and minimalism is conflict-tolerating. The first approach
tries to wish conflict away, the second to extirpate it, and the third to
live with it. Liberal democracy, the compound and real American
form, is conflict-denying in its free-market assumptions about the
private sector and its supposed elasticity and egalitarianism; it is
conflict-repressing and also conflict-adjusting in its prudential uses of
political power to adjudicate the struggle of individuals and groups;
and it is conflict-tolerating in its characteristic liberal-skeptical
temper. 84
The centuries-old debate over the degree of good that unions, as
participants in workplace decisionmaking, do in the private sector has
historically been a struggle between the anarchist and the realist

84.

BARBER, supranote 35, at 5-6.
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impulses within the American political tradition. Because Americans
tend to be conflict-denying (anarchists) in their "free-market
assumptions about the private sector,"8 5 many Americans struggle to see
the good that unions do within that anarchist framework. Instead, they
view unions as adding conflict to the workplace, diminishing the free
market values of efficiency and wealth maximization and therefore as
harming the United States, especially in today's global economy. This
view coincides with public support for employer interests over worker
interests. It was only during the Depression, when enough members of
Congress were convinced that union repression resulted from inequality
of bargaining power between labor and capital and that union repression
resulted in disruption to interstate commerce, that Congress could pass
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").8 6 In other words, it was
only when Congress could see that unions reduced conflict that it was
willing to accept unions. The NLRA's purpose is, in part, a realistic
approach to extirpating conflict, thereby promoting industrial peace
through administrative adjudication of labor disputes and the grievancearbitration machinery. Strikes and other forms of industrial war are a
last resort and have been further curbed by judicial amendment to the
NLRA."
As Barber and others have repeatedly recognized, protecting rights
and liberties is at the heart of the American liberal democracy. But how
we think of those rights and liberties shades how we regard solutions to
the problem of government and private-sector coercion. At one extreme
lie market libertarians, such as Friedrich von Hayek, whose scholarship
has discounted the dangers inherent in accumulated capital and who has
defined liberty in the negative sense as freedom from coercion,89 where
coercion is defined as the state of choosing "to serve the ends of
another" "in order to avoid a greater evil." 90 Reminiscent of the preDepression, Lochner-era of American jurisprudence, which raised
freedom of contract to a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest, the
purpose of Hayek's liberty theory is to show that government
interference into the individual's personal and business affairs should be
85. Id. at 6.
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
87. See id. § 151.
88. The right to strike is protected under 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163. For a discussion of how
economic weapons have been diminished see, for example, Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of
Union Repression in an Era ofRecognition, 62 ME. L. REv. 199, 220-21 (2010); James Gray Pope,
How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004).
89. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 11-12, 19 (1960).
90. Id.at20-21.
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minimal. 9' As a result, Hayek tends toward anarchism, or at least
minimalism, in his approach to government's role as a market regulator.
Along these lines, Hayek views unions as labor monopolies, privileged
by their exemptions from various torts and antitrust laws in the United
States and the United Kingdom. These privileges, holds Hayek, give
unions the power to create conflict where conflict is unnecessary-to
coerce employees and employers by exerting unlimited pressure on
them, in particular, by interfering with their freedom of contract and
freedom to bargain individually.93
Workplace participatory democracy theory provides an effective
response to Hayek and other market libertarians. As explained in
Section III.B.2, workplace participation results in certain goods, such as
educating the public in civic duties, which are ignored by market
libertarians, who focus on the property and managerial rights of owners
and employers. This educative effect dignifies workers by allowing each
and every one of them to realize their true self, free from one of the
gravest dangers to individual liberty-government interference.94 It also
protects workers from private sources of coercion-owners and their
managers. In the case of the public employee, the government is also
the employer. This fact makes it all the more important that public
employees have a voice against this doubly dangerous source of
coercion.
D. The Lack of ConstitutionalProtectionAfforded PublicEmployee
Speech is Yet Another Significant RationaleDemonstratingthe Needfor
Public Employee Voice Through Public-SectorUnions
There is no principled reason why employees should be denied the
opportunity to transform their character and become better citizens
simply because their employer is the government. As explained in Part
III.B and III.C above, participatory democracy arguments generally
contemplate the value of all types of social-unit sector participation,
including participation in local government to educate people in the arts
and skill of citizenship.

91. See
of bakers to
Amendment).
92. See
93. See
94. See

Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding state statute limiting the working time
be unconstitutional interference into freedom of contract under the Fourteenth
HAYEK, supra note 89, at 136, 267-68.
id. at 136, 269-70.
id. at 136-37.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4

322

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:301

Nor is there anything unique about the development of American
common law that would give us pause in applying the participatory
democracy rationale to public-sector unions. To the contrary, the
common law has, in fact, diminished the citizenship rights of publicsector employees, making it all the more imperative that these
employees have a voice check on our government.
The Pickering-Connick-Garcettitrilogy95 demonstrates the extent
to which the Court (the government's judicial branch) has diminished
the dignity of public-sector employees through the common law in the
past 40 years. Those cases present the question whether an employer
may lawfully discipline a public employee for engaging in free speech.
Given the considerable freedom from government interference that the
Court normally affords speakers, even fictional speakers such as
corporations,96 the answer here is quite surprising.
Under this trilogy, the Supreme Court has created a three-step
inquiry for determining whether the First Amendment protects public
employee speech. First, as a threshold matter, the court must determine
whether the speech falls within the public employee's job duties. 97 The
Court in Garcetti held that if the speech does fall within that employee's
job duties, then the speech is not protected and the employer does not
violate the Constitution if it terminates or otherwise engages in an
adverse employment action because of that employee's speech.98
Second, the court must determine whether the employee uttered speech
involving a matter of public concern. 99 The Court in Connick found that
"[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement."100 Courts, in the context of public employee speech, have
taken a narrow view of what constitutes speech of public concern,
95. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
96. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); see also C.
Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: CorporatePoliticalExpendituresand Redish's The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 646 (1982) (predicting that the "Supreme Court decision to
protect profit-oriented corporate political speech will, if followed, probably do more to undermine
people's 'ability to control [their] own destiny' than any of the Court's recent refusals to protect
self-expressive conduct" (quoting Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591, 593 (1982))).
97. See Garcetti,547 U.S. at 423.
98. Id. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.").
99. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
100. Id. at 147-48.
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defining it as "something that is a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public at the time of publication."' 0 ' Finally, even if speech is uttered on
a matter of public concern, the speech must be weighed against the
"interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs."'10 2 Applying this Pickering balancing test,
public employee speech is protected only when the interests of the
public employee in discussing a matter of public concern outweigh the
interests of the state as employer. 103
The Pickering-Connick-Garcettiframework is predicated on the
Court's assertion that "[w]hen a citizen enters government service, the
citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom." 0 4 Given this assumption, the Court fairly easily stripped
public employees of all constitutional protection from discipline to utter
speech made pursuant to that employee's official duties. But, as Justice
Stevens points out in his dissent in Garcetti, the answer to the
question-whether public employee speech uttered pursuant to official
duties should be constitutionally protected-must, at the very least, be
"'Sometimes,' not 'Never."' 05 As both Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter point out, "public employees are still citizens while they are in
the office." 0 6
Rather, when a public employee utters otherwise
protected speech that the government does not like, it is "immaterial"
whether that speech fell within that employee's official job duties.'0o
In contrast with the majority's view that a public employee "by
necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom," 08
Justice Souter observes that "a government paycheck does nothing to
eliminate the value to an individual of speaking on public matters, and
there is no good reason for categorically discounting a speaker's interest
in commenting on a matter of public concern just because the
101. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (per curiam).
102. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
103. See id. at 569-73 (holding that a public school teacher's act of writing a letter to local
newspaper criticizing the board of education's allocation of school funds coming from taxes did not
provide a lawful basis for teacher's dismissal, absent proof that false statements were knowingly or
recklessly made).
104. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
105. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

106. Id. at 427.
107. Id. at 427 (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413-16 (1979)
(applying constitutional protections to an English teacher who raised concerns to the principal about
the school's racist employment practices without discussing whether the speech was made pursuant
to the teacher's job duties)).
108. Id. at 418 (majority opinion).
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government employs him."109 He further observed that constitutional
protection rests on "the value to the public of receiving the opinions and
information that a public employee may disclose.
'Government
employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies
for which they work."' 110 Given Souter's starting points, he would have
protected public employee speech "addressing official wrongdoing and
threats to health and safety," even when uttered in the course of that
employee's official duties."'
As the Garcetti dissents point out, discounting public employee
speech merely because the public employee may be speaking pursuant to
his official capacity unduly restricts the civil rights of those public
employees, who may very well be speaking also as concerned citizens:
Indeed, the very idea of categorically separating the citizen's interest
from the employee's interest ignores the fact that the ranks of public
service include those who share the poet's "object .

.

. to unite [m]y

avocation with my vocation"; these citizen servants are the ones whose
civic interest rises highest when they speak pursuant to their duties,
and these are exactly the ones government employers most want to
attract. There is no question that public employees speaking on matters
they are obliged to address would generally place a high value on a
right to speak, as any responsible citizen would.112

In other words, civil servants often include public-minded citizens who
intertwine public service and private life. The Garcetti rule discourages
precisely the type of workers that the government should be trying to
attract.
Accordingly, it is antithetical to any conception of a democratic
workplace or of the dignified worker to hold-as Garcetti does-that the
government owns every syllable that the employee utters in performing
his or her job. Garcetti's vision of the public employee is insulting and
degrading to the civil servant." 3 By contrast, recognition of the value of
participatory democracy in the workplace would have led to the
conclusion that "public employees are often the members of [a]
community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the
operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial
109. Id. at 428-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 429 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994)).
111. Id. at 428.
112. Id. at 432-33 (footnotes omitted).
113. 1 would like to thank West Virginia University Law Professor Bob Bastress for raising
this issuing with me.
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concern to the public."' 1 4 It is patently obvious that the complaints of
police officers and firefighters, among others, are often both matters
pertaining to employment and matters of grave public concern. By not
allowing them "to speak on these matters, the community [is] deprived
of informed opinions on important public issues."" 5
The Pickering-Connick-Garcetti trilogy demonstrates one very
significant reason why public employees must have a voice outlet and
why public-sector unions are still very important: their speech as citizens
is under greater government coercion merely because they work for the
government. As Justice Souter points out, the majority's reliance on
federal and state whistleblower statutes is inadequate to protect public
employee speech or to provide an important check on government
coercion.1 6 Whistleblower statutes, in their current manifestation, are
hardly comprehensive and therefore would not capture much, if not
most, of the speech that should be protected.11 7 A dearth of voice outlets
resulting from inadequate speech protection, especially protection of
dissenting speech, is very likely to result in higher skilled public
employees exercising their exit option and leaving public service." 8
E. There Is No PrincipledRationalefor Denying Public Employees the
Right to Join Unions and Otherwise to Participatein Public Sector
Bargaining,Especially Because the Arguments Against Public-Sector
Unions Are Generally False, Misleading, or Pretextual
The media are filled with commentary explaining to the public why
Almost all of those
public-sector unions should be prohibited."'
arguments are either based on faulty data or are really arguments against
unions in general, as opposed to public-sector unions. Below, I debunk
some of the most common arguments against protecting public-sector
unions.
Many commentators baldly assert that public-sector unions have
wielded too much economic and political influence. As proof, these

114. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam).
115. See id.
116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439-40 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 440.
118. See Richard B. Freeman, The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job
Tenure, Quits, and Separations,94 Q. J. ECON. 643, 644 (1980).
119. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector
at
1,
available
at
1,
2010,
Aug.
REVtEw,
POLICY
Unions,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/43266.
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commentators assert that public unions have secured higher wages, more
generous defined-benefit pension plans, and job tenure.
The argument that public-sector employees, and especially unionrepresented public-sector employees, are paid higher wages than their
private-sector counterparts is a myth. The most recent scholarly paper
(the Lewin Report) to gather research results and analyze the data
concluded as follows:
The existing research, much of which is very current (completed
within the past two years), shows that, if anything, public employees
are underpaid relative to their private-sector counterparts. While
public-sector benefits are higher than private-sector counterparts, total
compensation (including health care and retirement benefits) is lower
than that of comparable private-sector employees. Erosion of publicsector pay and benefits will make it harder for public employers to
attract, retain and motivate the workforce needed to provide public
services. 120
Accounting for education, age, and other relevant variables, "public
employees earn 11.5 percent lower base pay (i.e., wages and salaries)
than their private-sector counterparts . . . ."121 The difference between
public and private-sector employee compensation shrank to 3.7 percent
when health, retirement, and other benefits were included in the
analysis. 122
The Lewin Report also verifies that the data from other research are
remarkably similar. In particular, the research studies report that public
employee base pay is between 12.0 percent and 11.4 percent lower for
public-sector employees.123 And the research papers report that public
employee total compensation is anywhere from 3.7 percent to 1.4
percent lower than equivalently educated private-sector counterparts.124
This argument against public-sector unions also conflates the
source of public-sector benefits, falsely attributing them to unions.

120. David Lewin et al., Getting It Right: EmpiricalEvidence and Policy Implications from
Research on Public- Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining, EMP'T POLICY RESEARCH
at
available
2011),
16,
2
(Mar.
at
NETWORK,
2
http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.employmentpolicy.org/files/EPRN%20PS% 0draft/
203%2016%201 1%20PM%20FINALtk-ml4%20edits.pdf.
121. Id. at 4 (interpreting the findings of Rutgers University Professor Jeffrey Keefe).
122. Id. at 5.
123. Id. at 5-6 (citing studies from Bender and Haywood, in addition to the Keefe study).
124. Id. at 5 (citing reports from Jeffrey Thompson (University of Massachusetts) and John
Schmitt (Center for Economic Policy Research) in addition to the Keefe study). See also Slater,
supra, note 7, at 5-10.
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Many benefits enjoyed by public-sector employees are not the result of
collective bargaining but the result of some other governmental process,
including the legislative process, and therefore benefit all public
workers. 12 5 This is true, for example, of most public servants for the
federal government; most federal employees, even managers, receive the
same menu of benefits; most federal-sector unions may not bargain over
that menu. 12 6 Similarly, many state government employees do not have
the right to bargain over their pension plans, which are a matter of
government policy, not of private ordering. This is true, with limited
exception, of public servants for the state of West Virginia. 12 7 And even
if some public unions have bargained over their benefits, unions cannot

125. GAO-10-754, supra note 10.
126. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) directs federal
agencies to negotiate in good faith with the union representatives of their employees. 5 U.S.C. §
7117. In particular, "[t]he duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any
Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of
any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation ...
[and] extend to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation [as defined] only if
the [Federal Labor Relations Authority] has determined. . . that no compelling need exists for the
rule or regulation." 5 U.S.C. §7117(a). "The scope of the agency's duty to negotiate extends to all
'conditions of employment,' id. § 7103(a)(14), a term that the Supreme Court has interpreted to
include wages and compensation. . . . unless these matters are otherwise expressly provided for by
law." AFGE, Local 3295 v. FLRA, 46 F.3d 73, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Fort Stewart Schools v.
F.L.R.A., 495 U.S. 641, 645-50 (1990)). In general, the pay for most federal employees "is fixed
administratively under the Prevailing Rate Systems Act," and is therefore "not negotiable." AFGE,
Local 1978 v. F.L.R.A. 960 F.2d 838, 840 (1992). The Federal Labor Relations Authority, with
court approval, has held under various rationales that federal agencies do not have the obligation to
bargain over wages and benefits with their employees' union representatives. See, e.g., AFGE,
Local 3295, 46 F.3d at 78-79 (holding that, by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act, Congress intended to endow the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision with
exclusive authority to set compensation levels and therefore that the Director is not under a duty to
bargain with the union over wages and benefits).
127. West Virginia public employees are not covered by either the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) or the West Virginia Labor-Management Relations Act, W.Va. Code §
21-I A-2(a)(2), both of which expressly exempt state employees. See also Woodruff v. Bd. of
Trustees of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 173 W.Va. 604, 606 n.2, 319 S.E.2d 372 (1984) (explaining
that West Virginia state employees are not covered by state or federal statutes that protect the right
to organize and bargain collectively). Accordingly, any rights West Virginia public employees may
have derive from the West Virginia Constitution as interpreted by the West Virginia Supreme Court.
Although that Court has recognized that collective bargaining between the state and its employees is
permissible, it has not held that collective bargaining is mandatory. For example, in Woodruff, the
Court held that public employees possess constitutionally protected free speech rights to picket, to
petition the state for redress, and to disseminate information about a labor dispute under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the West Virginia State Constitution. See
id. at 609-10. The Court also held that such a collective-bargaining agreement could not waive these
rights "inherent" in the State Constitution. See id. at 611. The Court further held that the particular
contractual language in this case was insufficient to constitute a waiver of the workers' First
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. See id. at 611-12.
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make those bargains happen without management approval. After all,
the government, not the union, is the source of the benefit. This
argument-that unionized public servants are overpaid-thus shifts the
burden of the government's mismanagement of its financial affairs onto
the union. Recall, too, that these pension plans were relatively wellfunded just a few years ago.128 This argument therefore also shifts the
blame of underfunded liabilities onto public-sector unions; yet, as
discussed in Parts I and II, those responsible for the 2008 financial crisis
(mostly private-sector financial institutions) are ultimately responsible
for creating these underfunded liabilities.
Similarly, tenure-which simply means that an employee can only
be fired for cause and with due process-is commonly granted under
civil servant statutes both at the federal and state level, irrespective of
union participation or representation.129 Tenure, which is also common
in the private sector in some industries and therefore is not unique to the
public sector, let alone to the unionized public sector, is typically
granted only after an employee has served some probationary period
ranging from two years, as in the federal government, to six or more
years, as in the case of professors.
Critics here may point back to the union's general treasury spent on
political candidates as an even greater influence on government
spending decisions. According to this argument, politicians (whose
primary concern is re-election) will be unduly influenced by unionized
public servants. This argument shifts the burden of the politician's lack
of integrity onto public servants. There are, however, better ways to
handle this problem, such as greater transparency in the cost of benefits.
In any event, this argument proves too much. As the data in Part II
show, corporations have much more influence over politicians than
unions, and yet no one is advocating for the removal of the corporate
form. 130 In this vein, this contention is really one of two arguments. At
most, it is an argument against Citizens United and an argument in favor
of curbing corporate political expenditures-not an argument against
public sector unionism. Or it is an argument against applying Citizens

128. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & LAURA QUINBY, THE FUNDING OF STATE
AND LOCAL PENSIONS: 2009-2013, 5-6 (2010).

129. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.91 (West 2011) (teacher tenure); § 38.514
(firefighter and police officer tenure).
130. See, e.g., Stephen Slivinski, The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government
Subsidizes U.S. Businesses, POLICY ANALYSIS, May 14, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa592.pdf (acknowledging that the federal government spent $92
billion on direct and indirect business subsidies in the private sector in fiscal year 2006).
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United to union speech (in other words, an argument in favor of content
discrimination).
Critics of public employee unions also mischaracterize the rights to
strike, to bargain collectively, to seek binding arbitration,' 3 ' and to
This argument conflates the legal
collect union dues as "privileges."
concepts of rights proper (also known as claim-rights) with privileges
(also known as liberty rights).1 3 A claim-right is a right that the right's
holder, such as an employee, can claim against a specific entity, such as
a public or private employer (the government or a private firm), who in
turn owes a duty to the right's holder.134 A right is the correlative of "a
duty or a legal obligation," defined as "that which one ought or ought
not to do. 'Duty' and 'right' are correlative terms. When a right is
invaded, a duty is violated."' 35 A privilege, by contrast, is the opposite
of a duty and the correlative of "no-right."l 36 The structure of the NLRA
illustrates the relationship between employee 3 7 claim rights and
employer' 8 duties. Under NLRA section 7, private-sector employees
hold "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
131. Strangely enough, arbitration is viewed as an anti-employee dispute resolution mechanism
because it is used by employers to limit liability, especially in the private sector.
132. See, e.g., McGinnis & Schanzenbach, supra note 119; Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with
available at
19,
Public Sector Unions, NAT'L AFFAIRS, Fall 2010, at 13,
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions.
133. See HOHFELD, supra note 80, at 36-37. The relationship between Professor van Alstyne's
analysis of the right-privilege distinction and as its application to public-sector unions is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally William W. van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
134. See HOHFELD, supra note 80, at 38.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 38-39.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (defining employee as "any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless [the Act] explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include [strikers], but shall not include [agricultural laborers], or [domestic servants], or [close
relatives], or . . . independent contractor[s], or . . . supervisor[s], or [employees or employers not

covered by the NLRA]").
138. See id. § 152(2) (defining employer as "any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include [the federal or state government acting as employer], or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . or any labor organization (other than when acting
as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization").
The labor rights of aviation and railroad employees are protected under the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2006), the labor rights of federal employees are protected by the Federal Labor
Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (2006), and the labor rights of state employees are protected by
state statute. The labor rights of state employees varies by state depending upon whether the state
has granted such rights through a public-sector labor relations statute or whether such rights depend
on the state's constitution as applied by its courts. For example, West Virginia state employees
would have a constitutional right to organize a union under Article 111,§§ 7, 16.
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own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .139
Employees can claim an obligation from employers that, in essence,
protects the employees' section 7 rights. In particular, NLRA section
8(a) articulates those duties by making it unlawful for employers to,
among other things, "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of [their section 7 rights]," 1 40 "dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any [union] or contribute financial or
other support to it,"l41 "discriminat[e] in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage [union] membership,"l 4 2 retaliate against an employee,14 3 or
"refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees
. . . ." 1 For example, an employer who threatens to or actually fires an
employee because of that employee's union activities violates the NLRA
because it violates that employer's duty under section 8(a).145
Labor rights such as these are not merely privileges but are more
properly characterized as claim rights. In the case of public-sector
unions, the rights' holders are public employees who are union members
(or in some cases, the unions themselves). In general, the government,
when acting as an employer, owes certain duties to public employees
who are union-represented.14 6 In some states, those duties include the
government's obligation to bargain collectively with the public-sector
union; in other states, those duties do not include that obligation. 47 The
right to binding arbitration is a dispute-resolving mechanism that is
viewed as a trade-off for the right to strike.148 For example, federal
employees who are union members do not have the right to strike, but
they do have the right to bring their labor disputes to an impasse
panel.14 9 Because many public-sector employees do not enjoy the right
to strike, they lack the most persuasive weapon necessary to convince
the public-sector employer to give in to their demands.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

29 U.S.C. § 157.
Id. § 158(a)(1).
Id. § 158(a)(2).
Id. § 158(a)(3).
Id. § 158(a)(4).
Id. § 158(a)(5).
Id. § 158(a)(1), (3).
See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127and accompanying text.
See supra note 29.
5 C.F.R. 2470.1 (2011).
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In any event, opponents of public-sector unions employ the term
"privilege" as a rhetorical device to conjure up the lay definition of
privilege as special or undeserved favor.' 50 This appeal to pathos is a
very common type of political messaging, but has no room in logical
legal discourse.
Critics of public-sector unions use the fact that government services
tend toward monopoly to argue against public-sector unions. As CCNY
Professor Daniel DiSalvo observed, "[t]he very nature of many public
services-such as policing the streets and putting out fires-gives
government a monopoly or near monopoly; striking public employees
could therefore hold the public hostage."' 5 ' Professor DiSalvo, quoting
New York Times labor reporter A. H. Raskin, concludes, "'[t]he
community cannot tolerate the notion that it is defenseless at the hands
of organized workers to whom it has entrusted responsibility for
essential services."'l52
There are several problems with this argument. As a threshold
matter, this argument does not appear to hold true for all governmentprovided services. For example, government does not appear to be a
monopolist provider (single seller) of educational, healthcare, or
sanitation services because there are many private schools, hospitals, and
waste removal companies to compete with these public services.
To be sure, in the public sector, government is a monopolist
provider of national defense, police, and fire services; but in those cases,
it is also a monopsonist buyer (single buyer) of the labor needed to
provide these services. Monopsony is conducive to labor exploitation
and unions are needed to break that monopsonistic hold on workers.15 3
For example, monopsony is the likely explanation for the reserve clause,
which bound every major league baseball player to his team
indefinitely. 154 Without the help of unions, baseball players may not

http://www.merriamONLINE,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
"privilege",
150. See
webster.com/dictionary/privilege (last visited May 19, 2011). See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 623, 626 (1996) (rejecting state's argument that its constitutional amendment, prohibiting all
government action designed to protect gays and lesbians, "does no more than deny homosexuals
special rights," and holding the amendment unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
151. DiSalvo, supra note 132, at 6.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our Coal Miners, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 87, 92-95
(2011) (describing the economic conditions in southwestern West Virginia that have resulted in coal
mine company monopsonies).
154. William M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 86, 110 (1997).
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have been able to break the team owners' monopsonistic exploitation of
those players.15

The recognition that the government as employer acts as a
monopoly is in fact a good reason in favor of public-sector unions.
Monopoly employers are more likely to exploit workers. Unions
redistribute bargaining power thereby bolstering the bargaining power of
the monopolist's employees. These employees learn the tools of
democracy that eventually break the monopolist's hold on decisionmaking and resource distribution.
Finally, even if a critic of public-sector unions can point to a
government-provided service in which the government is a monopoly
but not a monopsony (akin to Microsoft's position as a monopoly seller
of Microsoft Office but not a monopsony buyer of labor because it
competes with other high tech companies for competent computer
programmers and engineers), at most, that situation entails an argument
in favor of curtailing the right to strike among public employees in that
industry, not an argument for eliminating the right to join a public-sector
union or the right to bargain collectively. One such example could be
found among secretaries or other clericals who work for police or fire
departments. In these situations, we would have to ask ourselves
whether there is a good policy reason to prevent police department or
fire department secretaries from striking. Such analysis would require
more nuanced inquiries regarding the particular employee's job duties.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article is a small step toward showing why collective
bargaining, in general, and collective decision-making (public employee
bargaining), in particular, is integral to our democracy's vitality. As
explained above, participatory democracy theory contemplates the value
of all types of social-unit sector participation, including participation in
workplace decision-making, to educate people in the art and skill of
citizenship.1 6 These arguments show that there is no principled reason
that justifies denying employees the opportunity to transform their

155. Id. ("Monopsonistic exploitation arising from explicit collusion is probably rare but
occasionally large. Well-documented cases include U.S. baseball before the reserve clause and
perhaps other professional sports."). See 15 U.S.C. § 26b (eliminating baseball's exemption from
antitrust laws in this context and allows baseballs to become free agents); Morgen A. Sullivan, "A
Derelictin the Stream of the Law": OverrulingBaseball's AntitrustExemption, 48 DUKE L. J. 1265
(1999).
156. See discussion infra Part 11A-B.
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character and become better citizens simply because their employer is
the government. In fact, there are greater justifications for public-sector
unions insofar as government is potentially the most formidable source
of coercion against human liberty and dignity.
If these arguments so forcefully demonstrate the need for worker
voice, in general, and public-sector unions, in particular, then why have
politicians (who are supposedly unduly influenced by unions) targeted
and attacked public-sector unions? As explained above, the real issue is
how to solve underfunded liabilities. This pressing domestic issue of
our day can only be solved by examining two related questions-an
economic question and a fairness question. First, who is in the best
position (or what combination of players is in the best position) to pay
for these liabilities? Is it the state governments, some of which are so
financially strapped that they are contemplating bankruptcy? Is it the
taxpayer in the form of higher taxes? Is it the future taxpayer? Is it the
public employee, who is receiving the benefit? If so, which public
employee is in the best position to bear these costs? Is it current workers
(by increasing employee contributions), or is it retired workers (by
increasing retirement age)?
Second, the issue of underfunded liabilities compels us to review
the equities of the situation to determine who, as a matter of justice or
fairness, society should burden with these liabilities. In particular, in
coming up with solutions to these difficult policy questions, we must
come up with rationales that "no one could reasonably reject as a basis
for informed, unforced general agreement."'" One method for coming
up with such rationales would be to put ourselves into a Rawlsian
original position in search of the most just ways to distribute these
burdens.158 For example, those behind the veil of ignorance might be
given the context of today's economic situation and then tasked with
finding solutions. They might ask themselves, which is the fairer
solution-asking retired workers (who will ultimately receive the
benefit) to bear the cost of these benefits by raising the retirement age or
asking current workers (who will not receive these benefits) to pay for
these benefits. Or is it simply more just to spread the cost over society
by asking taxpayers to bear the cost?
Although these questions are beyond the scope of this Article, I
would like to outline a three-step method for attacking this problem.
First, we must get a handle on the extent of the unfunded liability issue.

157.

THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 153 (1998).

158. See generallyJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15-19 (1971) (revised ed. 1999).
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Think tanks have already begun to research this." 9 Second, we must
understand the legal environment in which these unfunded liabilities will
In many cases, state and local governments are
come due.
constitutionally, statutorily, or in some cases, contractually obligated to
pay these pensions. Therefore, if the government cannot pay, they are in
danger of violating state law. For example, in West Virginia, state
employees can challenge any change in vested pension rights under the
West Virginia Constitution.160 Third, once the facts and the state law are
known, we can come up with a solution that may be unique to each state.
In going through this analysis, we must understand the conflicting
interests that are creating the political tensions. State governments are
interested in fiscal sustainability, and attracting good workers through
pay, benefits, and other good terms and conditions of employment. State
governments will prefer defined contribution plans which are less costly
to the government. Public employees are interested in income security
and retirement security. Many of them rightfully feel that they have
These
made past wage-benefit trade-offs to secure retirement.
employees will typically prefer defined benefit plans. Taxpayers are
interested in government accountability, government competence, and
receiving more services for less money. There are also generational
interests, including state promises to past generations and cost-shifting
issues to future generations.
This crisis does give us food for thought. Although assessing
blame will do little to help now, it would be helpful to analyze the extent
to which the various parties contributed to the financial crisis. This
means that politicians need to stop deflecting blame onto public servants
and show the leadership that they claim to possess.

159. See, e.g., GAO-10-754, supra note 10; MUNNELL, AUBRY & QUINBY, supra note 128, at
4-5.
160. W.V. CONsT. art. II, §4 (prohibiting the enactment of any "law impairing the obligation
of a contract"); see Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 186-88 (W. Va. 1994) (upholding law that
increased contributions but striking down provision reducing employee's cost-of-living adjustment).
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